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This research and presentation thereof considers the ritual umuganda in terms 
of its contribution to national identity. In doing so, I consider the history of the 
ritual, its transformation in purpose over time, and the accompanying socio-
logical consequences of such purposes and transformations. The evidence in 
this case includes sociological analyses of the umuganda ritual itself; political 
speeches which underscore the type of popular mobilization contemporane-
ously undertaken and/or accomplished and its purpose for such; recent me-
dia articles relating to umuganda (written by both citizens and outsiders and 
by both those with affirmative and negative opinions concerning umuganda’s 
contribution to the Rwandan reconciliatory spirit and economy), as well as my 
own first-hand observation of and participation in umuganda. The available 
evidence demonstrates a strong correlation between participation in the ritual 
of umuganda and social and political mobilization in Rwanda’s earlier his-
torical periods in which the state effectively delineated and managed a nation-
building project. In conclusion, I argue that the effectiveness of the current 
umuganda ritual is largely unsuccessful in relation to nation-building, as it 
does not achieve a high degree of unified social or political mobilization within 
the Rwandan population that ultimately contributes to an identification with a 
single national identity. 
rwanda, the most densely populated state in africa, has experienced internal trauma like 
few others, has been governed by various colonizing powers (Germany and Belgium, as 
well as being greatly influenced by France), and has been torn apart by a series of geno-
cides following independence in 1962. Therefore, the rwandan collective identity has 
both reflected past suffering and simultaneously attempted to suppress it in an effort to-
ward progress, most notably through umuganda,1 the mandatory, state-led public service 
http://trace.tennessee.edu/pursuit
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program (Straus 2006). However, the use of umuganda has changed over time, shifting its 
purpose and role in nation-building. Implemented as a mechanism for social and political 
mobilization prior to, during, and after the 1994 genocide, the current ritual must reinvent 
the former tradition in order to successfully create a new rwandese identity with a collec-
tive past, present, and future, therefore not abandoning the old but rewriting its underlying 
purpose and redressing public perception. Within each period of umuganda’s practice, I 
shall consider its purpose for implementation; the characteristics ascribed to and adopted 
by the participants; the benefit reaped and for whom – the state as a collective entity, 
particular political groups, and/or specific economic classes; and the ultimate success in 
wielding the ritual of umuganda as a nation-building instrument. 
The purpose for practicing ritual and the manner of implementing it are commonly 
understood by political anthropologists as the foundation for nationalism, considering “na-
tionalism an ideology, nation a collectivity, and nation-building a process” (Purdekova 
2008, 10). Anthropologist David Kertzer (1988) delineates the importance of rituals in re-
lation to the political, most specifically the way in which rituals exert power within society 
and upon the individual within society: 
• Participation in ritual effectively and concretely provides a means for indi-
vidual citizens to relate to the abstract concept of the state (and, by exten-
sion, to connect the local community to the center of state power). 
• Further, this participation reinforces social cohesion and solidarity (with this 
solidarity achieved even without consensus among the group) and contrib-
utes to an individual’s sense of belonging to a nation. 
• The power of ritual is achieved not only through the surrounding social ma-
trix but also through the intense emotional and psychological underpinnings 
that urge a sense of connection.
Craig Calhoun (1997), along with Kertzer, emphasizes social cohesion in his con-
ception of nationalism but also notes the dynamic nature of the nation itself, with input and 
acceptance from both the state and the population as integral components to a stable and 
meaningful nation-building effort, and therefore also the importance of political legitimacy 
as granted by the people in furthering nationalism. Similarly, Crawford Young (1976) re-
flects both Kertzer’s and Calhoun’s emphasis on a shared sense of community in nation-
building but also highlights the importance of a shared past and future in accomplishing 
such. Each of these contributions to the construction and conception of a nation will be 
demonstrated in analyzing the promotion of rwandese nationalism through the ritual of 
umuganda. 
rwanda, unlike many colonized states, largely maintained its pre-colonial boundar-
ies and institutions, having already existed as a thoroughly institutionalized state. During 
the colonial era, rwanda’s European colonizers “incorporated, and in some instances, re-
inforced, rwanda’s precolonial institutions into the colonial state, and versions of those 
institutions persisted into the postcolonial state” (Straus 2006, 207). Umuganda presents a 
prime example of this; pre-colonial and colonial rwandese history contained similar com-
munity-centered, labor-oriented rituals. In pre-colonial society, the rwandese state had 
several informal institutions of labor mobilization; the one most closely resembling the 
post-colonial umuganda was uburetwa, which called for every household to provide two 
days of labor (for every five days) to local chiefs, the local central authority. However, this 
labor ranged from community-centered, such as clearing land for cultivation, to directly 
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benefitting the local authority, such as watching over the chief’s house by night (Straus 
2006). The colonial powers, particularly the Belgians, integrated this tradition of pub-
lic works projects along with facets of their labor law into a new colonial state project 
(Schaefer 2001). When the Belgians relaxed the number of days required for such work, 
they intensified labor mobilization and participation by requiring universal engagement 
(rather than household representation). 
Umaganda was implemented as a post-colonial public works program during the 
Habyrimana government in 1974 and was introduced as a uniquely Rwandan policy while 
actually retaining many aspects of the Belgian model (Schaefer 2001; Verwimp 2003). 
From 1973 to 1994, President Juvénal Habyarimana emphasized his conception of the 
“true” Rwandan identity, influenced by his own self-association as a Hutu and his military 
background: a “true” rwandan wants and has many children (as children are a source of 
production and protection), engages in agricultural production, and promotes the welfare 
of his or her community as well as the rwandese state above his or her own individual 
welfare (Verwimp 2003). In accordance with these characteristics of the “true” Rwandan, 
habyarimana introduced umuganda as a collective development strategy specific to 
rwandese traditions, values, and culture and drawing exclusively upon rwandan labor. 
habyarimana continually declared the rwandan nation’s strength lay in its numbers but 
simultaneously recognized the consequential need for greater production: 
[W]e must reconcile two things, on the one hand, the more numerous are we, 
the stronger are we because we have more arms and more brains, but the more 
numerous are we, the more we have to produce for that population in order to have 
enough food, to have enough education, to have clothes. We must reconcile these 
two parameters: population and growth. (Verwimp 2003, 6) 
Verwimp (2003) cites Hayarimana’s doctrine of “Collective Works for Development” 
and his government’s explanation of umuganda’s establishment, centered on political rhet-
oric concerned with nationalistic mobilization rather than historical accuracy: “The umu-
ganda policy was presented as the re-establishment of an institution that had long existed in 
Rwandan culture but that had been suppressed by the colonial economy” (16). This manner 
of defining the origin of umuganda and promoting the ritual as a reaction to colonialism 
further fosters national identity with umuganda as a distinctly rwandan tradition; however, 
the Habyarimana government’s ability to claim such with disregard to the colonial influ-
ence on the umuganda policy demonstrates the pliable nature of ritual in a political context, 
as Wande Abindole notes in describing the frequent African integration of ideas and prac-
tices to present a new form in emergent governments (UNESCO 1990). 
The habyarimana government presented the umuganda public works program as 
central to economic development efforts due to the free labor exerted toward state proj-
ects, such as schools, roads, sanitation facilities, health centers, and anti-erosion ditch-
es, but it was also key in promoting a single, cohesive national identity. In his political 
speeches, President habyarimana repeatedly and fervently underscored the necessity of 
all rwandans’ efforts for the successful development of rwanda through participation in 
umuganda, coordinated within each level of the government and in participation among the 
dominant political party MRND (translated from French, National Republican Movement 
for Democracy and Development).2 looking towards a future of a developed rwanda for 
the new rwandan, habyarimana, with his emotionally-charged rhetoric, either presup-
posed or hoped to persuade others of two points in order to have confidence in umuganda 
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as a development project. First, there is a common conception of development among the 
rwandan people. Second, there is a new, shared rwandan identity to be promoted and 
protected with which the population self-identifies. If the population does not sufficiently 
uphold the aforementioned points, there can be little hope of sustained, dedicated umu-
ganda service. 
Perhaps understanding this, habyarimana institutionalized umuganda as a highly 
repetitious ritual that was not blatantly mandatory through governmental statute but was 
implicitly so, initially through governmental coercion and later, once the ritual’s power 
caught hold, through emotional, nationalist appeal. Further, Habyarimana’s frequent and 
emotionally powerful rhetoric hastened the compelling transmission of the ritual’s power 
and deepened its emotional resonance. President habyarimana’s speeches commonly made 
broad nationalist appeals that supported his own political ideology while simultaneously 
and complementarily attacking the conceived enemy of his new rwanda nation: 
Umuganda – our collective work for development, that to the manual labor of 
everybody. It is inconceivable that we could do without Umuganda. a country 
is constructed by hands not by words! …The results obtained by Umuganda, its 
remarkable realizations that many countries envy us, constitutes the best proof that 
it cannot be separated from the progress rwanda made in the last 10 years, that is 
an essential part of that progress and that is corresponds without ancestral values 
– to engage oneself – so that everyone, by individual effort, performs better in a 
collectivity always in progress. Each intelligent and honest rwandan can see this.3 
(Verwimp 2006, 19)
President habyarimana’s political rhetoric thoroughly commended umuganda as a 
manner of unifying Rwanda through participatory labor – “‘The one who refuses to work 
is harmful to society’” (Verwimp 2003, 19) – and appealed to the majority peasant popula-
tion, defining and celebrating the “new Rwandan.” Through this repetitious, participation-
intensive ritual, laden with psychological and emotional heaviness due to the individual’s 
abstract connection of his or her contribution to the development of the rwandan state, 
citizens effectively conceive of themselves as part of a larger, cohesive community. In this 
way, umuganda under the habyarimana government successfully mobilized the rwandan 
population through a powerful, top-down nationalist program4:
The fact that everybody was required to participate, peasants as well as administra-
tors, workers as well as intellectuals, had an important role in the efforts under-
taken to reach a general mobilization. Umuganda is one of the prime examples 
of a top-down policy with an appealing development image that was designed to 
use and control peasant labour, to oblige the rwandan intellectual to do physical 
work, to give politicians discretionary power over labour and to indoctrinate the 
Rwandans with the regime’s ideology. (Verwimp 2003, 19) 
however, while habyarimana’s political rhetoric was overtly populist, declaring 
the purpose of umuganda universally beneficial in terms of economic development and 
the delivery of state services to the community, umuganda served to more fully address 
the elite economic and political interests, namely by fulfilling political goals and garnering 
greater political power for elites, rather than attending to the entire population’s needs as 
promised (Verwimp 2006).5 
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Therefore, with the overwhelming majority of the Rwandan population not signifi-
cantly or directly benefitting politically or economically from participation in umuganda, 
their continued participation in the ritual, particularly as it contributes to nation-building, 
must be explained in another manner rather than direct benefit. A type of Marxian theory 
can provide this explanation, as the ideas of the ruling class become those of the entire 
society (and contribute to a shared collective) and thus justify existing power differences 
(Kertzer 1988). 
As previously mentioned, the government and especially the dominant MRND party 
(to which President Habyarimana also belonged) exercised ultimate authority over the or-
ganization and administration of umuganda, as seen in the following excerpt from a na-
tional development promotional document:
Umuganda must be planned in order to reach its objective, developing our coun-
try by building the necessary infrastructure for its economy and allowing the new 
rwandan to engage in his work. Because of this, it has to be oriented towards 
directly productive actions. In order to increase the development projects in the 
Umuganda framework, the mobilization and sensitization of the popular masses is 
necessary and the MRND offers the appropriate way to do this.6 (Verwimp 2006, 20)
Therefore, the MRND had jurisdiction to – and did – present umuganda as a re-
action to colonial institutions and projects, including off-farm labor, the introduction of 
formal education, and the monetization of the Rwandese economy (Verwimp 2003). As 
previously stated, this reactionary espousal served to appropriate for rwandan national-
ist purposes a practice and policy that had been effectively practiced by colonizers and 
to promote individual association of umuganda with the successful development of the 
independent rwandan state. In addition, local politicians and administrators wielded re-
markable discretionary power in fulfilling their duties to organize each week’s umuganda 
(Verwimp 2003). For example, these leaders decided and approved which public works 
projects were undertaken as well as which persons may be excluded from their work re-
sponsibility; not surprisingly, those persons very friendly to the government could escape 
umuganda participation. 
This phenomenon is curious when considering umuganda as a nation-building rit-
ual. Previously analyzed evidence has suggested that umuganda effectively mobilized the 
rwandan population to form a new rwandan nation and that the habyarimana government 
consciously used umuganda to do so. However, the MRND-granted umuganda labor waiv-
ers must be considered as either harmful to the nation-building effort or innocuous to it:
• Harmful: firstly, decrease participation and thereby damage the sense of 
participation toward a common goal by a shared community; secondly, 
detract from direct power over umuganda wielded by the government in the 
form of the organization and administration of the ritual also in the form of 
ideology. 
• Innocuous: Conversely, if umuganda’s foundational purpose is nation-
building, then such a waiver may be permissible and innocuous, as such 
persons certainly belong to the nation, though still counterintuitive to the 
development of the nation. however, if the purpose of umuganda is solely 
collective economic development, then such waivers for governmental al-
lies would be inexcusable. 
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In addition, there is much debate concerning President habyarimana’s political 
rhetoric (and action) as either promoting unification and reconciliation between Hutus and 
Tutsis (Mamdani 2001) or as inciting conflict among them (Verwimp 2006). Furthermore, 
scholars debate the rhetoric glorifying the rwandan peasant as easing class distinctions 
(or dissolving them completely) (Uvin 1998) or as exacerbating the Hutu/Tutsi dynamic 
(Verwimp 2006). As previously outlined, President Habyarimana frequently used inclu-
sive language, such as our, all, everyone, Rwanda(n), in reference to umuganda progress. 
Additionally, President Habyarimana blamed the “‘feudal mentality’” that some Rwandans 
hold and condemned “‘the one who refuses to work as harmful to society’” (Verwimp 
2003). According to Verwimp (2003), both of these statements by the president likely were 
references to the professionally elite Tutsi and were understood to be such by his audi-
ences. This, along with a series of discriminatory and violent actions directed against Tutsi 
citizens, provided a catalyst for the infamous 1994 genocide. 
The post-colonial umuganda project’s success in popular mobilization proved foun-
dational to the subsequent genocide. Verwimp (2003) notes, “Umuganda gave the local 
party and state officials knowledge and experience in the mobilization and control of the 
labour of the peasant population” (p. 18). In a study conducted by Scott Straus (2006) to 
ascertain common variables between genocide participants and the significance of such,7 
two categories of his study were a perpetrator’s state political party affiliation as well as his 
prior civic and state involvement. according to the gathered interview responses, previous 
umuganda participation constituted one of the strongest contributing factors to genocide 
participation: “some 88 percent of respondents took part in the program” (Straus 2006, 
p. 19). Straus does not, and cannot, determine if participation in umuganda predisposed 
genocide perpetrators to acts of violence; the correlation simply demonstrates that a large 
percentage of genocidaires had already engaged in an organized state-sponsored program. 
Similarly to umuganda, the genocide effectively mobilized all sectors of the 
Rwandan population – urban and rural populations and all social and economic classes. 
Furthermore, according to Straus’s interviews of detained genocidaires, many perpetrators 
equated murdering Tutsis with state-decreed policy and therefore complied with what they 
deemed state authority’s orders, either fulfilling their patriotic duty or preferring such ac-
tion to the feared consequences of refusal (Straus 2006). Most strikingly, national and local 
officials used the word umuganda in describing the genocidal killings to be performed 
both in organizational meetings within the government and in public forums, including 
on the radio (Verwimp 2006). The depth of this compliance and the consequences of such 
highlight the extent of the rwandese government’s ideological power; this serves in stark 
contrast to other contemporaneous African state models (Straus 2003). In particular, due 
to the extensive government presence, which effectively managed affairs on each level of 
society (especially on the local level), citizens understood and largely embraced their role 
to be played in relation to the community and to the larger rwandese state, as seen through 
the efficient and thorough genocide mobilization. 
The 1994 genocide highlights the successful advancement of rwandan nationalism 
through umuganda,8 as an institutionalized ritual demanding popular mobilization served 
as the foundation to fulfill the MRND’s conception of the new Rwandan and the new 
rwanda, in accordance with habyarimana’s ideology of a peasant’s rwanda, a hutu de-
fined and dominated nation. This special umuganda had the explicit purpose of systemati-
cally annihilating the Tutsi and dissenting Hutus – moderate politically or protective of 
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Tutsis – in order to promote the chosen “true” Rwandan identity. Through the nature of the 
organization and administration of umuganda, the state effectively mobilized the individu-
al rwandan on the local level for national action in the genocide. Moreover, the emotional 
appeal of the ritual of umuganda itself was heightened in the political context preceding the 
1994 genocide, particularly with the nation being conceived of as an exclusive socio-ethnic 
group struggling for political, social, and economic resources. 
With the genocide ended by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the transition led by 
RPF leader Paul Kagame, and Kagame then elected President, Kagame furthered the idea 
of a new rwanda completely remade after genocidal destruction: one with a new govern-
ment, new constitution, and in some ways a new culture.9 however, umuganda presents 
an example of how this new vision is attempted with regard to rwandan traditions and 
subsequently confounded. Umuganda retained much of its institutional characteristics but 
shifted its purpose to reflect the new state’s values, with reconciliation and unity playing 
larger, more emphasized roles. President Kagame is actively implementing umuganda as 
a mechanism for unity and community engagement.10 Furthermore, while the umuganda 
projects undertaken and the government organization for such are similar to those under 
the habyarimana government, various aspects of umuganda administration and partici-
pation have changed: the frequency of participation (1 day per month); the introduction 
of themed umugandas, each with a chosen topic on which a local authority speaks; and 
encouraged public discourse. These changes seem to promote nation-building by fostering 
shared beliefs and building legitimacy for government; however, they do not address a 
key challenge and goal in the Rwandan nation context – reconciliation.11 Kagame attempts 
to accomplish reconciliation through collective participation in umuganda: all participate 
towards shared development of rwanda and thereby reconcile the old and build a new 
de-ethnicized nation. As Purdekova (2008) notes, this reconciliation strategy highlights 
the recognition of ethnicity as central to conflict in Rwanda; therefore, the government has 
directly sought to neutralize ethnicity in reconciliation efforts.12 
Therefore, with reconciliation a key element to rwandan nation-building in the 
post-genocide context, one must consider if the reconciliation efforts of various sorts are 
working. While there are differing opinions of the success of the reconciliation effort, 
reconciliation does not appear to be occurring based upon much of the available (and nec-
essarily recent) scholarship as well as my personal observations. Therefore, the Rwandan 
nation’s formation and growth is detrimentally impeded. While the causes for these failures 
are doubtlessly various and complex, two central reasons are (1) various factors contribute 
to segments of the population challenging the legitimacy of the Kagame government and 
(2) there continue to be schisms in the Rwandan population, which reinforce past conflict 
and thereby prohibit the formation of a unified Rwandan nation. First, the legitimacy of 
the Kagame government in nation-building is central for many reasons (as previously in-
troduced by Calhoun), not only as it pertains to implementing umuganda as a tool for na-
tion-building. While it is currently difficult to assess the degree of legitimacy the Kagame 
government is granted by the rwandan population, various recent news articles and blogs 
would suggest there is little political freedom in rwanda, and some perceive President 
Kagame as extremely corrupt (Kagire 2010; Umuhoza 2010). Because of the highly po-
larized historio-political climate in rwanda and the manner of Kagame’s ascendency to 
power, those who consider his rule illegitimate will deny his ideology and associated poli-
cies and likely refuse to participate in declared reconciliation measures, such as umuganda; 
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in this way, these persons would cease to identify with the rwandan nation as Kagame is 
trying to create it. Second, the success of reconciliation is pivotal to the creation of a new 
and sustainable rwandan nation; however, the assessment of reconciliation is currently 
difficult (more so than political legitimacy). While in Rwanda, I observed some events and 
attitudes that led me to believe strides are certainly being made, but that people still con-
sider their identities hutu or Tutsi before rwandan.13 as Benedict anderson’s conception 
of the nation as an imagined community highlights, the rwandan nation (if one can call it 
that by Anderson’s standards) has perhaps an insurmountable challenge of conceiving of a 
shared past, present, and future, as the rwandese people continue to live in a past of power 
dynamics. 
Endnotes
 1 In Kinyarwanda – one of the official and most widely spoken languages of Rwanda – the 
word umuganda has been translated to signify different ideas; perhaps this simply reflects the transla-
tor’s personal preferences, but it seems to further demonstrate a historical evolution in the conception 
of umuganda in relation to its social and political ideology. According to Verwimp (2003), the word 
umuganda signifies the type of wood used to construct a house, as the term was introduced and used 
in the habyarimana regime. Umuganda also has been translated as “contribution” in a rwandan 
newspaper article that issued suggestions for increasing umuganda’s usefulness within the commu-
nity (New Times 2008). In an article including an interview with current Rwandan President Paul 
Kagame, the word umuganda is said to mean “we work together” (Rwanda News Agency 2010). 
 2 The MRND, while officially a political party (and the overwhelming majority political 
party at that time), achieved such power through subtle political maneuvering and attempts to subvert 
the political from the political sphere. While the MRND party was everywhere and truly authoritar-
ian, the idea of the political polluted the habyarimana scheme; therefore, “[e]very effort was made to 
forget – at least officially – that politics existed” (Verwimp 2006, p. 13). Further, during this period, 
there was little, if any, open political competition. 
 3 “Youth and Development,” speech at President Habyarimana’s visit to the National 
University of rwanda, May 21, 1986.
 4 Verwimp (2003) notes that umuganda attendance began to decline dramatically as the pow-
er of the Habyarimana government declined (19), or more specifically the rate at which the popula-
tion subscribed to the ideology of Habyarimana government and its related nation-building project 
and granted legitimacy to Habyarimana government. 
 5 As studied in Verwimp (2003), umuganda and other economic policies undertaken in the 
habyarimana government, including those relating population, education, food price, land, exchange 
rate, and the coffee and tea industries, consistently favored the traditionally more powerful economic 
player (the state-owned company, the whole-sale trader, the importer, etc.) at the expense of the 
individual producer. as economic conditions later worsened, political loyalty to habyarimana (and 
by extension, participation in umuganda) dramatically fell. These conditions provided the setting for 
actions taken in the organization of the 1994 genocide. 
 6 L’Umuganda dans le Developpement National, 1998. 
 7 Scott interviewed 210 male detainees in fifteen central prisons over a six month period. 
This is the largest known study of perpetrators. he selected only sentenced detainees, reasoning that 
their testimony was already aired and recorded and their sentences determined and therefore they 
would have less incentive to lie; with this in mind, he only interviewed men as no women confessed 
to killing in the genocide, and those incarcerated for participation constituted a very small percentage 
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of the population. lastly, he conducted all interviews in a private room with a rwandan assistant who 
speaks Kinyarwanda. This man lived in rwanda before and during the genocide and lost family in the 
genocide but is not associated with the current regime. 
 8 While highly successful, the 1994 genocide must be noted as clearly an extreme and highly 
negative manifestation of nationalism. 
 9 This new Rwanda was to be totally remade: new flag, new motto (“Unity, work, patrio-
tism”), etc. 
 10 Further, in a Rwandan newspaper article interviewing President Kagame about the impor-
tance of umuganda, umuganda is translated as “we work together” (Gahindiro 2008). This shift in 
translation of umuganda itself seems to highlight a differing perspective in the purpose of the ritual 
and the value it brings to rwandese culture. 
 11 The themed umugandas have not seemed to address topics of reconciliation but rather the 
collective action is hoped to address reconciliation; for example, one umuganda in which I partici-
pated while working in Rwanda in the summer of 2009 was themed around business cooperation and 
openness with the West. 
 12 For example, under Rwandan law, Hutu/Tutsi distinction and designation is illegal, as it 
hinders reconciliation efforts by furthering ethnic cleavages. 
 13 For example, the Kigali Memorial, the largest and central genocide memorial in Rwanda, 
was attacked in the night. according to a colleague who worked at the museum, these attacks are not 
uncommon.
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